For Immediate Release: October 31, 2000
Press Release
Remarks by Kevin O'Neill
Remarks by David Albright, ISIS President, at the release of "Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle"
Good morning and welcome to our press conference, where we are releasing our new report, entitled Solving the North Korean Puzzle, and discussing some of the report's recommendations.
I would like to introduce several co-authors: at the table with me is Kevin O'Neill, who is co-editor of the book, and in the audience is Holly Higgins and Corey Hinderstein, both with ISIS. Holly is the author of several chapters of the book, and Corey is our specialist on commercial satellite imagery, which the book prominently features. We also have here a special guest, Joel Wit, who is a Guest Scholar at the Brookings Institute and the author of one of the chapters in our book. Joel is presently writing a book on the 1994 North Korean nuclear crisis and U.S. policy.
Following my remarks, Joel will say a few words, followed by Kevin.
A central message of Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle, is that North Korea must be more transparent if the nuclear issues are to be resolved. A helpful sign was the October 12, 2000 U.S.-North Korean Joint Communiqué, where both sides agreed "on the desirability of greater transparency in carrying out their respective obligations" under the 1994 Agreed Framework. As you know, the Agreed Framework traded North Korea's indigenous nuclear program for two modern and more proliferation-resistant light-water reactors (LWRs).
Secretary of State Albright reaffirmed the importance of transparency in Seoul last week when she said that "the issue has been one of central importance" to the United States "and transparency is key."
But what does transparency mean, and why is it important? Much of Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle deals with these questions. In particular, the report treats in detail the conflict between the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and North Korea during 1992 and 1993 over the extent of North Korean nuclear activities.
Questions raised during that period remain at the heart of the dispute over North Korea's nuclear activities. Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle contains many examples of transparency-and the lack of adequate transparency-during this tense period, which almost led to war in 1994.
Initially optimistic in the spring of 1992, the IAEA subsequently uncovered a number of inconsistencies in North Korea's declaration. These inconsistencies pointed to the undeniable fact that North Korea had separated more plutonium than it had declared, perhaps enough for one to two nuclear weapons.
Most of the evidence developed by the IAEA involved complicated sampling and analytical methods, which are described in the book. However, some dramatic evidence depended on a series of high-resolution satellite images provided by the United States. These images showed that North Korea was concealing activities from the IAEA, particularly the concealment of what are suspected to be facilities to hold radioactive waste from the processing of spent nuclear fuel. Such processing separates plutonium from the spent fuel.
Under the Agreed Framework, North Korea will have to allow the IAEA to sample at these sites and resolve the various inconsistencies to the satisfaction of the IAEA.
This step is scheduled to occur after a significant portion of the first LWR is completed, but before sensitive nuclear components of the first reactor are shipped to North Korea.
This date of reckoning is currently expected to take place in about 2004.
Another problem area is whether North Korea has undeclared nuclear activities that have continued despite the Agreed Framework or have developed since 1994. Suspicions of undeclared reactor or reprocessing activities led the United States to ask to inspect Kumchang-ni in 1999--nothing nuclear related was found at this site, however.
Most of the Clinton administration's recent effort to increase North Korea's transparency appears aimed at bilateral, "Kumchang-ni type" inspections. We have heard reports of U.S. efforts to obtain a yearly quota of visits to sites in North Korea. Such visits or inspections are useful and can provide some of the needed transparency. However, more transparency is needed.
Two different transparency requirements must be addressed. The first is that the IAEA must be satisfied about North Korea's explanations of its past nuclear activities.
The second consideration is that the IAEA must be able to state that it has confidence that North Korea does not have undeclared nuclear activities. At this time, Kumchang-ni type inspections are not sufficient to develop such confidence.
One approach is to deal with these problems under the timetable established by the Agreed Framework-that is, they would start to be addressed in about 2004. This approach is legitimate. The consequence, however, is a likely one-to-two-year (or even longer) pause in the construction of the LWRs. Such a lengthy pause is not desirable. It will cause an increase in the cost of the reactor project, could raise tension among North Korea, the United States, and KEDO, and may derail the Agreed Framework altogether.
ISIS proposes in Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle to start preparing for these inspections as soon as possible, with the goal to significantly shorten the time needed to finish the inspection process.
Toward this end, the United States and its allies must educate North Korea about what adequate transparency is, including what modern IAEA inspections will require. Much has changed since the early 1990s, with IAEA inspections becoming more intrusive, requiring broader access, and depending on more detailed declarations of nuclear and nuclear-related activities in a country.
In addition, North Korea should be asked to take steps to increase its nuclear transparency in the near term.
What are some of the steps North Korea could undertake while still accepting that final work must follow the Agreed Framework's timetable? A first, easy step is for North Korea to cooperate with the IAEA in preserving historical records and information. It is not an easy task to preserve documents and records, which too often are misplaced or disposed of unintentionally. Also, interviews with current and former workers at North Korean nuclear facilities may be important, particularly since, as these workers retire or pass away, the information retires or passes away with them.
Another easy step is that North Korea could again provide written assurances of its intention to be transparent at the proper moment, including pledges to allow IAEA inspections to "go anywhere, anytime" when inspections resume.
Again in the easy category, North Korea could invite IAEA member states or nongovernmental organizations to inform its experts and decision-makers of what will be required by the inspection process.
A more difficult but, potentially, more important measure is for North Korea to allow the IAEA to implement advanced safeguards procedures at non-frozen facilities at Youngbyon, similar to those procedures now performed in other countries, including South Korea and Japan. For example, the IAEA could apply these procedures at the Isotope Production Laboratory and the Institute for Radiochemistry. The Isotope Production Laboratory is where North Korea has said it first separated plutonium. Neither facility has received adequate IAEA inspections.
To improve the climate, North Korea could rejoin the IAEA, which it quit in 1994 at the height of the crisis. It could also ask the IAEA to help on safety issues relevant to the LWR project. The IAEA has special expertise in this area and routinely works worldwide on reactor safety.
In addition, North Korea could prepare a broadened declaration to the IAEA, even if it doesn't give the declaration to the IAEA until later. North Korea could also work with the IAEA to take samples at key nuclear sites for analysis at a later date.
Madeleine Albright is right when she says transparency is key to success of the Agreed Framework. North Korea's commitment to transparency, or lack thereof, will be one of the most reliable indicators of North Korea's true commitment to denuclearization and peaceful intentions.
Achieving transparency is never easy in the nuclear area. IAEA inspections can cause tension even in the most cooperative state, much less in a state like North Korea, which is widely accused of seeking nuclear weapons and hiding its activities. Nonetheless, avoiding another impasse between the IAEA and North Korea, as in the early 1990s, is in everyone's interest.
Ultimately, however, most of the responsibility for the success or failure of the Agreed Framework rests with North Korea. Without adequate North Korean transparency, the North Korean nuclear puzzle can't be solved and the Agreed Framework will fail, as it should.
A major purpose of obtaining the agreement was to ensure that North Korea does not have nuclear weapons, although certification was delayed to a future date. Lack of North Korean transparency would be a clear sign that this approach has failed. But with adequate nuclear transparency, the nuclear puzzle can be solved. It is in the power of North Korea to permit a solution sooner rather than later.