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For Immediate Release: October 31, 2000
Remarks by David Albright
Remarks by Kevin O'Neill
"Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle"
In the wake of U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's visit last week to North Korea, the Washington, D.C.-based Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) today released a study that reviews U.S.-led efforts to cap North Korea's nuclear weapons program and ensure that the Korean peninsula is free of nuclear weapons. Among its recommendations, the study urges the United States and its allies to seek concrete steps by North Korea to increase its nuclear transparency, particularly steps that can ensure the success of anticipated inspections of North Korea's nuclear facilities.
The 324-page study, entitled Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle, is edited by ISIS President David Albright and Deputy Director Kevin O'Neill, and includes contributions from the editors, other ISIS staff, and three well-known nongovernmental experts on U.S. nonproliferation policy towards North Korea.
"Secretary of State Albright's trip to Pyongyang was a milestone in U.S.-North Korean relations," said David Albright in releasing the book. "This event could not have taken place without the necessary foundation for peace and stability that the Agreed Framework provides. Clearly, since its inception six years ago, the Agreed Framework has been indispensable in supporting improved U.S.-North Korean relations, as well as bettering ties between North and South Korea."
The 1994 Agreed Framework is the key nuclear nonproliferation agreement between the United States and North Korea. Under the Agreed Framework, the United States has organized an international effort, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), to provide two, modern and more proliferation-resistant nuclear reactors to North Korea, in exchange for the "freeze" and eventual dismantlement of North Korea's indigenous nuclear program. According to Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle, absent the Agreed Framework, North Korea would now be capable of producing enough nuclear explosive plutonium for more than 50 nuclear explosives per year, and could have already accumulated enough plutonium for 60-80 nuclear weapons.
However, Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle concludes that many difficulties must be overcome if the Agreed Framework is to be fulfilled. "The new U.S. President-be it Vice President Gore or Governor Bush-will inherit a policy that is full of uncertainty, despite the stabilizing effect that the Agreed Framework has had to date," Albright said.
Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle warns that the Agreed Framework is approaching an "impending cliff" that could return the region to crisis. Within the next years, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will have to verify that North Korea's indigenous nuclear program-including its plutonium stock-is fully accounted for and devoted exclusively to peaceful uses. The IAEA's inability to do so in 1993-1994 nearly led to war between the United States and North Korea.
This verification exercise, which is scheduled to begin sometime in the next U.S. administration, is complicated under the best of circumstances and could take two years or longer to complete. During this time the construction of the modern nuclear reactors in North Korea will come to a halt. A lengthy pause in construction will increase the cost of the reactor project, could raise tensions among North Korea, the United States, and KEDO, and may derail the Agreed Framework altogether.
To avoid a lengthy delay, North Korea could take steps soon to increase its nuclear transparency. Such steps could include a pledge to allow nuclear inspectors to go "anywhere, anytime" once inspections begin; the taking and preservation of samples of nuclear waste from disputed facilities for analysis at a later date; and the preparation of a broad, comprehensive declaration of all nuclear-related facilities in North Korea.
"The primary responsibility is borne by North Korea to take concrete steps to demonstrate its commitment to be more transparent about its nuclear activities," Albright said. According to Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle: "Most of the responsibility for the success or failure of the Agreed Framework rests with North Korea. Without adequate North Korean transparency, the North Korean nuclear puzzle cannot be solved, and the Agreed Framework will fail, as it should. A major purpose of obtaining the agreement was to ensure that North Korea does not have nuclear weapons, although certification was delayed to a future date. Lack of North Korean transparency would be a clear sign that this approach has failed."
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