For Immediate Release: March 8, 1999
for more information contact:
David Albright, President, at (703) 683-4862
or Kevin O'Neill, Deputy Director at (202) 547-5883
To order copies of the report.
WASHINGTON, D.C. -- "Dangerously disappointing" are
the current efforts to prevent the misuse or migration of plutonium
and highly enriched uranium (HEU), say the editors of a report
released today by the Institute for Science and International
Security (ISIS). Plutonium and HEU are the key "fissile"
materials in nuclear weapons.
The report, entitled Challenges of Fissile Material Control,
contains a unique grading of the efforts to strengthen international
controls on nuclear explosive materials.
"This report shows that despite progress so far, the world
is far from secure from the dangers posed by plutonium and HEU,"
said David Albright the President of ISIS. "Without more
concerted efforts in this area," he added, "we face
a growing risk of the unthinkable--nuclear weapons in the hands
of terrorists or countries like Iraq." Albright and ISIS
Deputy Director Kevin O'Neill edited the report.
"Effectively managing, controlling, and disposing of fissile
materials is essential to preserving international security and
reducing the risk of nuclear war, nuclear proliferation and nuclear
terrorism," write the editors of the 130-page report. While
many initiatives have been offered to address the threats posed
by fissile materials, the editors find that "the overall
pace of creating and implementing the necessary controls has been
disappointing."
In Challenges of Fissile Material Control, the editors
offer a unique critique of the ways in which nuclear explosive
materials are managed in both civil and military programs. The
report looks across the board at the many efforts undertaken to
reduce the risks posed by these materials. The report identifies
and evaluates 19 separate policy objectives and awards letter
grades ("A" through "F") to each objective.
According to the editors, "this approach offers a coherent
and realistic vision of how the international community is addressing
the threats posed by inadequately controlled fissile materials,
and can identify those controls that are the most urgently in
need of improvement."
Of the 19 objectives identified in the report, only five received
a "B" grade or higher, while six either received either
a "D" or an "F". Overall, the report concludes
that fissile material control efforts deserve a grade of "C",
a far too low a grade given the risk posed by fissile material.
"There aren't very many success stories," O'Neill said.
Nuclear Leakage from Russia Remains a Significant Concern
The report finds that the vast majority of Russia's fissile materials
remain dangerously susceptible to theft, despite efforts, often
with U.S. assistance, to improve the security of these materials.
"It seems likely that hundreds of metric tons...will remain
poorly protected well into the next decade," say the report.
Sustaining improvements made to facilities containing nuclear
materials is expected to be difficult in the long term, particularly
given the inadequate physical protection and accounting `culture'
in Russia today. But such improvements are vital to U.S. and international
security.
Iraq is a Nuclear "Wannabe"
The report says that inadequate controls increase opportunities
for countries or terrorist groups to obtain fissile materials
for nuclear weapons. Iraq, in particular, remains a foremost concern.
"Although its pre-Gulf War facilities have been destroyed,"
says the report, "it retains extensive expertise and ambition
to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program." Should Iraq
clandestinely obtain fissile materials or nuclear technologies
from Russia, its could be within months of having a nuclear explosive.
Enforcement Mechanisms are Weak
The report concludes that mechanisms to enforce international
commitments and treaties are insufficient. "Various agreements
constrain nations from acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities,"
says the report, "but the international community's response
to violations of these agreements has been uneven and inconsistent."
In particular, North Korea is not fully cooperating with the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to preserve information about its
past nuclear activities. Such information is needed to confidently
determine the quantity of separated plutonium that North Korea
now possesses. Unless such a determination can be made, the U.S.-North
Korean "Agreed Framework," which trades the construction
of modern, more proliferation resistant nuclear reactors in North
Korea for the closure of North Korea's existing nuclear reactors
and related facilities, is likely to fail.
Enforcing UN Security Council resolutions in Iraq, which call
for inspections and monitoring of Iraqi nuclear activities, is
also proving elusive. Iraq has resisted UN resolutions and balked
at the IAEA Action Team inspections. "The Security Council
may be unable to enforce a rigorous inspection regime in Iraq,"
the report says.
Production Cutoff Efforts Praised
One of the few successes found in the report are efforts to begin
negotiations on a fissile material cutoff treaty, which would
end the production of fissile materials for weapons. Although
negotiations on a cutoff treaty have been stalled for several
years, the report notes that chances for negotiating a treaty
"are improving." The report acknowledges that "agreement
[on a treaty] will be difficult to achieve after serious negotiations
begin." But contributor William Walker from the University
of St. Andrews in Scotland argues that these negotiations "would
help to drive the internal and external searches for, and development
and implementation of, effective controls" on military fissile
material stocks.
Issues on the Horizon
Challenges of Fissile Material Control concludes with
a chapter that discusses the need for broadened controls on two
additional nuclear explosive materials--americium and neptunium
237. Although these materials are not "fissile," they
can be used to make nuclear weapons. "One or more nuclear
weapon states may have tested a nuclear explosive using neptunium
237," the report reveals. The most likely candidates are
France or the United States.
Although the quantities of separated americium and neptunium are
small, the authors argue that more information and greater controls
are needed to prevent these materials from being misused. "A
decision to apply safeguards to neptunium and americium in the
non-nuclear weapon states appears premature," the report
says, But increased monitoring at facilities where these materials
are handled or stored, revised physical protection standards,
and adequate coverage by export control regimes are warranted.
Other Key Findings of the Report
The report also makes several other important conclusions:
· International safeguards have improved, but they
face challenges to implementation. In particular, a new
agreement to carry out key aspects of strengthened IAEA safeguards
must be ratified by the member-state before these safeguards take
effect in that state. Several countries suspected of harboring
nuclear ambitions, particularly Iran, have yet to ratify this
agreement. The report also finds that paying for the strengthened
safeguards program is also challenging.
· The five acknowledged nuclear weapon states remain
reluctant to make realistic declarations of their excess fissile
material stocks. This reluctance reflects overly pessimistic
projections about future nuclear arms reductions, residual cold
war mindsets, and too generous calculations about the size of
HEU reserved needed for naval reactors. Far greater quantities
of military fissile material stocks could be declared excess,
according to the report, and be subject to international control.
· Disposing of excess fissile materials remains challenging.
Efforts to blend down excess HEU to low-enriched uranium suitable
for nuclear power reactor fuel are periodically beset by fluctuations
in the commercial uranium market. Plutonium disposition programs
have not gotten off the ground and remain the subject of sometimes
bitter political controversy.
· Civil plutonium stocks continue to grow.
The reprocessing of spent civil nuclear fuel far outstrips the
ability to use the resulting plutonium in power reactors. As a
result, large quantities of separated civil plutonium are accumulating.
· No solution has been found to permanently disposing
of nuclear waste. Lack of progress on a geologic repository
has a profound negative effect on all efforts to eliminate both
civil and military nuclear weapons-usable fissile materials.