April 21, 1998 rev.1
The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), a
Washington D.C.-based, non-profit research organization, has analyzed
the Chairman's Working Paper from the 1997 NPT Preparatory Committee
meeting (Prepcom). The Working Paper was divided into two principal
sections: points of general agreement among the parties, and proposals
made by country delegations on which there was not agreement.
The Chairman's Working Paper organizes the country proposals by
general topic headings, such as Universality, Non-proliferation,
Nuclear Disarmament, and Safeguards.
ISIS believes that the `basket of ideas' under paragraph 4, which
the NPT parties began to compile in 1997, should be expanded to
include all vital issues before the parties concentrate on achieving
agreement on specific proposals. To this end, ISIS has reorganized
the "Nuclear Disarmament" section according to subtopics
(denoted by underlined headings), so that the proposals
in the Working Paper on a given aspect of disarmament can been
compared and analyzed together. Each subsection includes all proposals
on that specific topic, and wherever possible, the country which
made each proposal is identified at the beginning of each paragraph.
In addition, at the end of each topic subsection are proposals
in bold lettering, identified as "ISIS." These are proposals
drafted by ISIS, and designed to address aspects of disarmament
which are not covered by any country's submission. These proposals
are suggested for consideration by delegates for addition to the
Chairman's Working Paper. ISIS's suggestions are not the only
possible additions, but are intended to make the `basket of ideas'
as complete as possible.
This document should in no way imply support for, or opposition
to, the specific points already included in the Chairman's working
paper.
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
Australia: The States parties welcome the adoption and opening
for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as
an indispensable step forward on the path to nuclear
disarmament, and as the fulfillment of a principal component of
the decision of the 1995 Conference on principles and objectives.
The Treaty establishes a norm against nuclear testing, which is
reflected in its signature by more than 140 States. All States
parties aim to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty at the earliest possible date, as a demonstration of the
strength of international support for the Treaty and in order
to facilitate its entry into force at the earliest possible time.
Canada: We call on all States to make the utmost efforts to promote the earliest entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, through all means possible up to and including the Conference of the States Parties to be held in 1999.
Canada: We emphasize that article 5 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, referring to peaceful nuclear explosions, has been redefined and overtaken under the terms of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
Canada: We recognize the decisive role that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty plays in preventing the development of new nuclear weapons and the modernization of existing ones. We look to the nuclear-weapon States to signal their unequivocal support for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, pending its entry into force, by declaring their intention never again to conduct nuclear explosions.
PRC: The States that have not yet signed the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty are
urged to do so at an early date, and all signatory States should
strive to achieve the early entry into force of the Treaty.
The States parties emphasize the importance of making every effort
to promote the earliest entry into force of the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, in accordance with article XIV of the
Treaty, despite its shortcomings and to prepare the Treaty for
implementation in a manner that prevents, to the maximum extent
possible, further qualitative development of nuclear weapons.
Japan: The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is a major step
in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, especially as a
means of constraining the development and qualitative improvement
of nuclear weapons and of preventing the development of advanced
new types of nuclear weapons. It is thus necessary for all States
signatories, by contributing to the work of the CTBT Preparatory
Committee, to make steady efforts to establish the CTBT regime,
including verification systems. All signatories should strive
to achieve the early entry into force of the Treaty. Those States
which have not yet signed and ratified the Treaty are urged to
do so at the earliest possible date.
EU: The States parties welcome the conclusion of the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty in 1996, and call on all States which have not yet done
so to sign and ratify the Treaty at the earliest possible date
[If the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has not yet entered
into force:]
, in particular those States upon whose adherence entry into force
of the Treaty depends.
New Zealand (NZ): The States parties welcome the adoption and
signature by more than 140 countries of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty and underline their commitment to strictly observe its
provisions pending entry into force. The States parties not yet
party to the Comprehensive Nuclear- Test-Ban Treaty undertake
to join this Treaty. The States parties further agree to pursue
all possible measures consistent with international law to accelerate
the ratification process in order to facilitate the early entry
into force of this Treaty.
South Africa (SA): The adoption of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty should be recorded as one of the goals of the States parties
that has been accomplished. Paragraph 4 (a) of the principles
and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament should
be replaced by a call on the States parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to work for the early entry
into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and for
its signature and ratification by all the members of the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
ISIS: States recognize that the CTBT does not include an
explicit commitment by the
weapon states to halt development of new or modified nuclear weapon
designs. States parties urge the NWS not to develop new, advanced,
or militarily-significant nuclear weapons under a CTBT.
Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty
Australia: The States parties renew their commitment to the immediate
commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory
and universally applicable convention banning the production of
fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator
of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein.
Canada: We look to the earliest possible commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament towards a fissile material cut-off convention, on the basis of the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein.
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM): The States parties support the
establishment of a treaty banning the production and stockpiling
of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive
devices in the Conference on Disarmament. It would be a significant
contribution to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation provided
that such a treaty is non-discriminatory, effectively verifiable
and universally applicable.
PRC: All States should work for the immediate commencement and
early conclusion of the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament
on a non-discriminatory, universal and internationally and effectively
verifiable convention banning the production of fissile material
for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance
with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference
on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein.
The States parties emphasize the need to pursue negotiations on
a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning
the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of
the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the
mandate contained therein.
Japan: Now that the CTBT has been concluded, a fissile material
cut-off treaty (FMCT) is the next step in nuclear disarmament.
It is regrettable that negotiations on FMCT have not yet commenced
in the Conference on Disarmament. All means should be explored
to realize the early commencement of negotiations on FMCT.
EU: The States parties call on all States to sign and ratify a
non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention, negotiated
in the Conference on Disarmament, banning the production of fissile
material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,
in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of
the Conference on Disarmament of 24 March 1995 (CD/1299) and the
mandate contained therein.
NZ: The States parties continue to attach high priority to negotiations
on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention
banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons
or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement
of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and
the mandate contained therein. The States parties agree to consider
what further steps might be taken to enable these negotiations
to begin promptly.
SA: (a) The States parties should welcome progress made in the
negotiation of a
non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning
the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other
explosive devices in accordance with the Shannon report and the
mandate contained therein.
OR
(b) The States parties should renew the call contained in the
principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament
for the Conference on Disarmament to commence immediately negotiations
on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention
banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons
or other explosive devices in accordance with the Shannon report
and the mandate contained therein. All States parties that are
members-of the Conference should work actively to achieve that
goal.
The States parties support the initiation of negotiations on a
fissile material cut-off treaty as an important step for multilateral
action and recognize both the disarmament and non-proliferation
aspects of a fissile material cut-off convention.
P5: We also reaffirm our readiness for the immediate commencement
and early conclusion of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament
on a non-discriminatory, universal and internationally and effectively
verifiable convention banning the production of fissile material
for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, a goal
contained in the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear
non-proliferation and disarmament and as its second step, following
the completion of the negotiations on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty.
P5: We encourage all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear
Weapons to fulfil this shared commitment set forth in the decision
on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and
disarmament. We also stress the importance for the States which
are not yet parties to the Treaty to join the negotiations on
a fissile material cut-off treaty in accordance with the statement
of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and
the mandate contained therein.
ISIS: States recognize the FMCT obligation in the P&O's
document.
ISIS: States welcome any steps which could move the FMCT negotiation
forward,
including the establishment of a committee to discuss technical
questions related to an FMCT, including, but not limited to, verification,
implementation, and existing stocks.
Unilateral Declarations of Military Fissile Material Stocks
Canada: Pending conclusion of such a [FMCT] convention, we
urge the nuclear-weapon States to affirm or reaffirm, as the case
may be, their commitment to forever cease production of fissile
material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
ISIS: States parties will declare that all production of fissile
material for nuclear explosive purposes has ceased, and declare
all facilities related to fissile material production for nuclear
explosive purposes.
Stocks of Military Fissile Material
Canada: Determined efforts should be made by the nuclear-weapon
States to reduce
weapons-usable fissile material stockpiles and to place more of
such material under the safeguards of the International Atomic
Energy Agency.
Norway: There would be merit in voluntary measures to increase
transparency on holdings of
weapons-grade fissile material, plutonium and highly enriched
uranium (HEU). Transparency as a confidence-building measure should
apply to all States with a nuclear capability, but for obvious
reasons the primary burden would fall on the nuclear-weapon States.
Norway: A fundamental prerequisite for transparency would be the
application of consistent and strict standards of accounting and
secure handling and storage procedures for fissile material at
the national level.
Norway: Voluntary transparency measures of this character would
facilitate negotiations on a
"cut-off" treaty as well as any future talks on nuclear
disarmament.
Norway: The following measures could be considered for successive
implementation:
(a) All nuclear-capable States would submit information on their stocks, if any, of weapons-grade fissile material;
(b) Cooperative international measures would be put into place in order to clarify and confirm these declarations;
(c) The nuclear-weapon States, or any State that submits information on holdings of weapons-grade fissile material, could permit inspection of such holdings. The aim would be to ensure that the inventory in storage can only be withdrawn for non-weapons purposes;
(d) Agreed monitored net reductions from stockpiles could be envisaged.
EU: The States parties welcome efforts by the group of seven
major industrialized countries and the Russian Federation to address
the issue of management of plutonium from dismantled nuclear weapons.
Japan: The efforts of the international community to promote and
assist in the dismantlement of nuclear weapons and the management
and disposal of fissile materials derived from dismantled nuclear
weapons should be further encouraged.
ISIS: States urge the nuclear weapons states to take further steps
to increase transparency of activities related to military stockpiles
of fissile materials, in particular to:
1) increase the amount of military fissile material declared excess and place this material under international safeguards;
2) declare the amount of fissile material dedicated to military (weapon or naval) use, and the amount declared excess;
3) declare the forms in which fissile materials are held; their quantity and locations; and their manner of storage; and
4) provide information about status and location of facilities involved in HEU production and Pu separation.
ISIS: States urge the nuclear weapon states to determine
to the greatest accuracy possible their total production of fissile
material for nuclear explosive and naval purposes.
ISIS: States recognize that the vast majority of military fissile
material is not declared
excess, and is not under safeguards.
ISIS: To facilitate negotiations of nuclear disarmament, states
urge the deepening of
bilateral cooperative measures between Russia, the United States,
other countries and international organizations aimed at raising
standards of material protection control and accountancy (MPC&A),
and at managing nuclear weapon dismantlement and the safe storage
and disposition of weapon materials.
ISIS: States are encouraged to pursue agreements concerning the
transparency,
verification and management of excess stocks of military fissile
material.
ISIS: States support the extension of IAEA safeguards to all non-military
facilities and
materials in the nuclear weapon states and non-NPT countries.
ISIS: States are urged to adopt disposition strategies that would
largely eliminate excess military stocks of HEU and plutonium
over the next 20-30 years, and that would curtail the unnecessary
production of new stocks of HEU and separated plutonium.
START Process
Canada: We welcome the joint statement by Presidents Clinton and
Yeltsin in Helsinki on 21
March 1997 committing to the commencement of negotiations on a
START III agreement, immediately once START II enters into force,
which would establish, by 31 December 2007, lower aggregate levels
of 2,000 to 2,500 strategic nuclear warheads, possible reductions
in tactical nuclear systems and other measures to promote the
irreversibility of these deep reductions.
Canada: The States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons expect
these commitments to be realized as soon as possible.
Japan: Systematic and progressive efforts pursued by the nuclear-weapon
States to reduce
nuclear weapons globally are an important element in the full
realization and effective implementation of article VI. The commitment
made by the President of the United States of America and the
President of the Russian Federation at the Helsinki summit meeting
to further reduce, in the context of the START process, their
strategic nuclear arms by the year 2007, is most welcome.
[If START II has not been ratified:]
EU: The States parties call for the START II Treaty to be ratified
as soon as possible and for an early start to negotiations on
a START III treaty.
[If START III has not been concluded:]
EU: The States parties call for an early conclusion to negotiations
on a START III treaty.
P5: In this context we welcome the recent understanding reached
by the Presidents of the
Russian Federation and the United States of America at Helsinki
on further reductions of nuclear weapons building on progress
already achieved.
P5: The other steps being taken by us in this area are also to
be welcomed.
Post-START III/Deep Reductions
Canada: We call upon other nuclear-weapon States to commit immediately
to not increasing their inventories and to engage in nuclear
disarmament negotiations among the five, in parallel with START
III.
EU: Welcoming the progress towards nuclear disarmament made by
the nuclear-weapon
States, including that made unilaterally or bilaterally under
the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) process, the States
parties call for further progress towards global reductions of
nuclear arsenals. The States parties urge the nuclear-weapon States
to continue the determined pursuit of systematic and progressive
efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate
goal of eliminating those weapons, and all States to continue
the determined pursuit of general and complete disarmament under
strict and effective control.
NAM: The nuclear-weapon States should express their commitment
to undertake a step-by-step reduction of the nuclear threat and
a phased programme of progressive and deep reductions of nuclear
weapons, and to carry out effective nuclear disarmament measures
with a view to the total elimination of these weapons.
Ireland: In the context of the "systematic and progressive
efforts" which they have agreed to
pursue, the nuclear-weapon States should set out their perspective
on the future steps they will take to reduce nuclear weapons globally,
with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons.
Japan: Concrete nuclear disarmament steps by each nuclear-weapon
State are further
encouraged. In the light of General Assembly resolution 51/45
G of 10 December 1996, entitled "Nuclear disarmament with
a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons", every
nuclear-weapon State is invited to inform the international community
of the activities and progress in the area of nuclear disarmament.
These efforts would contribute to transparency and confidence-building.
SA: The nuclear-weapon States, and in particular the Russian Federation
and the United
States of America, should be called upon to continue in the determined
pursuit of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear
weapons globally and to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion
negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects
under strict and effective control. The other nuclear-weapon States
should join in the process of structured and verified nuclear
disarmament as soon as possible.
The States parties endorse the effectiveness of the step-by-step
process of nuclear disarmament and recognize that nuclear disarmament
can only take place in a stable international security environment.
ISIS: Encourage early conclusion of START III. Urge US and
Russia to begin
negotiations on further steps to reduce arsenals. Urge US and
Russia to include verifiable warhead dismantlement and other transparency
measures as part of these agreements to increase confidence and
make reductions irreversible.
ISIS: Urge the United States and Russia to continue the strategic
arms reduction process and initiate negotiations to verifiably
reduce nuclear arsenals to roughly 1000 warheads at the earliest
possible time, and include verifiable warhead dismantlement and
other transparency measures as part of these agreements to make
reductions irreversible.
ISIS: Urge the five nuclear weapon states to inititate transparency
discussions with a view to multilateralizing force reduction negotiations.
ISIS: Urge the five nuclear weapon states to initiate multilateral
negotiations to verifiably reduce nuclear arsenals to a few hundred
warheads at the earliest possible time, and include verifiable
warhead dismantlement and other transparency measures as part
of these agreements to make reductions irreversible.
Complete Nuclear Disarmament
PRC: An international convention on the complete prohibition and
thorough destruction of nuclear weapons under effective international
supervision should be concluded through negotiations with the
participation of all States.
NAM: The States parties should agree on a recommendation to the
Conference on Disarmament to establish, on a priority basis, an
ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament to commence negotiations
on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the complete
elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified framework of
time, including a nuclear-weapons convention. A universal and
legally binding multilateral agreement should be concluded committing
all States to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and
to commence negotiations on a treaty banning the production and
stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other
nuclear explosive devices. The ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament
would take into account the proposal for a programme of action
for the elimination of nuclear weapons submitted by 28 members
of the Conference belonging to the Group of 21 (CD/1419) as well
as any other existing proposals and future initiatives in this
regard. In this context, the nuclear-weapon States should adopt
a flexible approach, taking into account their commitment, as
stated in article VI of the Treaty, to pursue in good faith negotiations
on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament.
Nuclear disarmament is further substantially facilitated by the
continued easing of international tension and the strengthening
of trust between States which have prevailed following the end
of the cold war. The undertakings with regard to nuclear disarmament
as set out in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
and the principles and objectives adopted by the 1995 Review and
Extension Conference should thus be fulfilled with determination
and without further delay. In this regard, the nuclear-weapon
States reaffirm their commitment, as stated in article VI, to
pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating
to nuclear disarmament as well as their commitment to the principles
and objectives adopted by the Conference.
The States parties reaffirm their commitment to pursue negotiations
on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament aimed at the complete
elimination of nuclear weapons and to continue to identify, negotiate
and implement further steps necessary to achieve this objective
within the shortest possible framework of time.
NZ: The nuclear-weapon States parties reaffirm their commitment
to fulfil with determination their obligations under article VI,
and undertake to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion
negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects
under strict and effective international control. In this context,
the nuclear-weapon States parties declare unequivocally their
commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons and agree to
start immediately on the practical first steps and negotiations
required for its achievement.
NZ: The nuclear-weapon States agree to pursue with determination
the elimination of nuclear weapons through all available channels,
including in bilateral negotiations and in negotiations among
all five nuclear-weapon States.
NZ: The States parties agree that the Conference on Disarmament,
the international community's standing body for disarmament negotiations,
is mandated to pursue all items on its agenda, including nuclear
disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is the appropriate
forum for multilateral dialogue and the negotiation of further
steps, as appropriate, which contribute to the goal of the elimination
of nuclear weapons.
SA: The States parties call upon the Conference on Disarmament
to establish an ad hoc
committee to deliberate and agree upon the practical steps and
negotiations required for a programme of systematic and progressive
efforts to eliminate totally nuclear weapons.
Sweden: The States parties take note of the advisory opinion of
the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996 and in particular
the unanimous conclusion by the Court that "there exists
an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion
negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects
under strict and effective international control".
Sweden: The States parties welcome the reaffirmation by the nuclear-weapon
States in their joint statement of 8 April 1997 to the Preparatory
Committee at its first session that they would continue to pursue,
with determination, systematic and progressive efforts to reduce
nuclear weapons globally with the ultimate goal of eliminating
those weapons. The states parties underline the importance that
the specific steps to be taken by the nuclear-weapon States in
accordance with their commitment be identified and fully implemented.
Sweden: The States parties welcome the report of the Canberra
Commission, which proposes a series of concrete measures towards
a nuclear-weapon-free world, and commend the report for consideration
in international disarmament forums with a view to exploring the
possibilities of implementing the steps set out in the report.
P5: It is the responsibility and obligation of all States to contribute
to the relaxation of
international tension and to the strengthening of international
peace and security. The nuclear-weapon States underscore the important
and tangible progress achieved in the area of nuclear disarmament
and reaffirm our determination to continue the pursuit by the
nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to
reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating
those weapons, and by all States of general and complete disarmament
under strict and effective international control
ISIS: States recognize that today's need for stringent international
controls over nuclear materials and technologies is little different
from that which would be required for total nuclear disarmament.
Therefore, policies should be created as if total nuclear disarmament
were about to occur, irrespective of its feasibility or desirability.
ISIS: States recommend the formation of an informal P5 nuclear
disarmament discussion
committee in the NPT review context.
ISIS: As a confidence building measure, states parties urge the
NWS to report
individually and on a regular basis to the CD and the NPT Prepcom
on the steps they have taken toward fulfilling their article VI
commitments.
ISIS: States urge support for the proposal in the CD of an Ad
Hoc Committee on Nuclear
ISIS: Disarmament to deliberate upon practical steps for systematic
and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons as well as
to identify if and when one or more such steps should be the subject
of negotiation in the Conference.
ISIS: Emphasize the necessity that verifiable warhead dismantlement
be an integral part of all bi- and multi-lateral nuclear disarmament
efforts.
ISIS: Emphasize the importance to further arms reduction agreements
of maintaining accurate, verifiable records of unilateral warhead
dismantlement activities.
Nuclear Weapons Alert and Deployment Policies
PRC: The nuclear-weapon States concerned should abandon their
policy of nuclear deterrence; the States with large nuclear arsenals
should further reduce drastically their nuclear stockpiles, and
should destroy the removed nuclear warheads rather than simply
transfer them from deployment to storage.
PRC: No country should develop and deploy space weapon systems
or missile defence systems that undermine strategic security and
stability.
PRC: States with nuclear weapons deployed outside their borders
should bring all these
weapons home.
Japan: The nuclear-weapon States are invited to consider further
steps such as gradually taking nuclear forces off alert and/or
removing nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles.
Russia: The nuclear weapons of all the nuclear-weapon States
should be stationed only within
their own territories.
P5: We also welcome the removal of all nuclear weapons of the
former Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics from the territories of Belarus, Kazakstan
and Ukraine.
The States parties would support the objective of increased transparency
regarding short-range nuclear weapons in the context of its recommendations
on nuclear disarmament.
ISIS: Nuclear weapon states are urged to make a commitment not
to increase the number of operationally deployed nuclear weapons.
ISIS: NWS are invited to consider separating warheads from delivery
systems and placing both into secure storage under international
monitoring.
Other International Treaties
PRC: All nuclear-weapon States should undertake not to be the
first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances,
and to conclude a legally binding international instrument to
that effect.
[If the Chemical Weapons Convention is not universal:]
EU: The States parties urge all States that have not yet done
so to adhere to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their
Destruction.
[If negotiation on a Biological Weapons Convention verification
protocol is not completed:]
EU: The States parties urge the Ad Hoc Group of the States parties
to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production
and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons
and on Their Destruction to complete as soon as possible a legally
binding verification and compliance regime for the Treaty.
EU: The States parties recommend that all regions make major reductions
in their level of
conventional arms, as has been done in Europe on the basis of
the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.
Russia: An exchange of views and negotiations should be begun
on a treaty on nuclear security and strategic stability, with
the participation of all nuclear-weapon States, taking into account
the specific nature of their nuclear arsenals and possibly with
a certain asymmetry of commitments.
Welcoming the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free
zones, States parties support the regional or nuclear-weapon-free-zone
approach to the provision of legally binding security assurances,
as opposed to a global convention.
Other Issues
The States parties recognize that the nuclear arms race between
the United States of America and the Russian Federation has ended
and that this aspect of article VI has been fulfilled.
P5: We stress the importance of early signature and ratification
of the Treaty by all States,
which would facilitate its early entry into force; this is an
objective we fully share.
ISIS: States are urged to limit the number of `subcritical'
nuclear experiments they
conduct, and to carry out all such experiments in a transparent
manner, with monitoring by international inspectors.