http://isis-online.org/ en robertavag@gmail.com Copyright 2012 2012-01-20T17:56:28+00:00 http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/no-obama-letter-to-iran/http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/no-obama-letter-to-iran/#When:17:56:28Z On January 18, conservative Iranian lawmaker Ali Motahari announced and Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast confirmed that President Barack Obama had sent a letter to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei warning Iran against closing the Straits of Hormuz and requesting direct talks.  Mehmanparast said that Iran was considering an official response.  Majlis National Security and Foreign Policy Committee deputy chairman Hojjatoleslam Hossein Ebrahimi also went on to describe the details of the letter at length.  U.S. officials meanwhile have denied the existence of such a letter, and ISIS has also learned from a European source who has proven reliable in the past that President Obama did not send the letter, which Iranian officials claim was passed through three different diplomatic channels.  ISIS is interested in confirming whether anyone has learned otherwise. It is interesting to speculate on the motive for such a rumor if it was started by Iran.  Perhaps some in the regime seek to start a national conversation about direct Iran-U.S. talks, or wanted to test the official U.S. reaction in the media to the notion of conducting direct talks amidst an atmosphere of growing tension.  In an even more convoluted theory, Iran may have sought to embarrass President Obama for seeking talks with Iran while he faces increased criticism over his Iran policy by hawkish U.S. lawmakers and presidential candidates.  On the other hand, rumors are sometimes only rumors with no clear intent. Iran, ISIS In Brief 2012-01-20T17:56:28+00:00 http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/reality-check-shorter-and-shorter-timeframe-if-iran-decides-to-make-nuclear/http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/reality-check-shorter-and-shorter-timeframe-if-iran-decides-to-make-nuclear/#When:16:55:14Z In the discussion regarding the nature of the Iranian nuclear program, some have sought to downplay Iran’s nuclear progress by emphasizing that Iran has not yet “made the decision to build a nuclear weapon.”  While it is true and important that there are no indications that Iran has made a decision to actually construct a nuclear weapon, such a statement does not accurately portray the real concern about Iran’s nuclear program and progress. In fact, Iran has already made a series of important decisions that would give it the ability to quickly make nuclear weapons.  In doing so, it has pursued a strategy of nuclear hedging: it has put together a gas centrifuge program to provide the necessary fuel for a weapon, worked on developing a nuclear weaponization capability, and developed a medium-range ballistic missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead, all under ostensibly civilian purposes or great secrecy.  The international community should not take ease in the absence of this final decision since Iran has already overcome many obstacles on the path to finally acquiring nuclear weapons. Whether or not Iran will ultimately build nuclear weapons depends greatly on what is done now.  Given Iran’s steady, albeit slow progress, downplaying the threat can end up serving to undermine the development of non-military methods to keep Iran from building nuclear weapons. Iran’s strategy of “nuclear hedging,” or developing the capability to rapidly build nuclear weapons under the cover of a civilian nuclear program, is laid out in the evidence of work on nuclear weaponization, particularly efforts to make specific nuclear components, contained in the November 2011 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards report on Iran.1  The intent of such hedging is very different than the latent nuclear weapons capabilities possessed by states such as Japan or Germany and is inimical to the objectives of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).2  If Iran’s ability to quickly build nuclear weapons increases during the next few years, this will only shorten the period of time between taking a decision to build a bomb and constructing one. The lengths Iran has gone to both conceal major elements of its enrichment program, such as the originally undeclared Natanz, Kalaye Electric, and Fordow enrichment facilities, and establish controversial capabilities, such as its 19.75 percent low enriched uranium (LEU) production program, have raised concerns that its hedging strategy may be aimed at eventual highly enriched uranium production.  The discovery of the Fordow enrichment facility compounded concerns that Iran originally intended for this facility to make highly enriched uranium at some point or preserve a capability to do so.  Since 2010, when Iran began enriching to higher levels, it has already made enough 19.75 percent LEU to fuel the Tehran Research Reactor for many years.  Iran’s stockpiling of this material may be another component of its hedging strategy which is aimed at keeping adequate fuel on standby for a quicker breakout to nuclear weapons.  There is still time for the international community to find a peaceful resolution to the Iranian nuclear issue.  As Iran’s timeline to nuclear weapons decreases, however, there is an inversely increased urgency to find this resolution.  It is unwise to measure this level of urgency by relying on the fact that there remains no evidence that Iran has taken the last step to actually construct a nuclear explosive device. Eschewing strengthened non-military options in the form of pressure and sanctions ignores this shortening timeline and makes it more likely that Iran will progress in its hedging strategy, augmenting the chance for armed conflict.     1 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and the relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, November 8, 2011: http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/IAEA_Iran_8Nov2011.pdf 2 John Carlson, “Iran Nuclear Issue—Considerations for a Negotiated Outcome” (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Science and International Security, November 4, 2011.  Available at: http://www.isisnucleariran.org/assets/pdf/Carlson_Iran_deal_4November2011.pdf Iran 2012-01-18T16:55:14+00:00 http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/pakistani-man-sentenced-to-prison-in-u.s.-export-violation-case/http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/pakistani-man-sentenced-to-prison-in-u.s.-export-violation-case/#When:14:22:08Z On January 6, 2012, a U.S. district court in Maryland sentenced Nadeem Akhtar, 46, to 37 months in jail for exporting and attempting to export a variety of U.S. dual-use goods to the Pakistani nuclear program between 2005 and 2010.  Akhtar, a citizen of Pakistan residing in Maryland, had faced up to five years in prison and fines of $250,000 for nine counts of export control violations, money laundering, and conspiracy related charges.  Akhtar pled guilty in September 2011 for sending to the Chashma nuclear power plant and Space Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO) in Pakistan goods purchased through his company, Computer Communication USA (CC-USA), such as calibration and switching equipment, resins for coolant water purification, surface refinishing abrasives, and radiation detection devices.  These goods had applications in nuclear power and fuel reprocessing plants, the latter which Pakistan would use in its production of plutonium for nuclear weapons. Akhtar duped seven U.S. companies into selling him the goods, which he illegally exported to Pakistan via transit through Dubai with the assistance of associates located in New York, Dubai, and Pakistan.  The associate in Pakistan directed Akhtar’s procurement attempts at the behest of Pakistani government entities and paid him a commission for items successfully received.  He claimed the end-users of the goods were trading companies located in Dubai.  In many of the instances, better corporate vigilance and improved communication between the U.S. government and companies involved likely would have detected Akhtar’s attempts before they were successful. Read ISIS’s case study on the case of Nadeem Akhtar here. Read the U.S. district court of Maryland press release here. Pakistan, Illicit Trade 2012-01-11T14:22:08+00:00 http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/burmas-nuclear-aspirations-less-reason-now-for-concern/http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/burmas-nuclear-aspirations-less-reason-now-for-concern/#When:14:39:43Z In November 2011, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made a ground-breaking visit to the reclusive state of Myanmar (Burma) to discuss, among other topics, Burma’s commitment to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.  During the visit, Burma’s president, Thein Sein, provided strong assurances of Burma’s commitment to United Nations Security Council resolutions against North Korea and suggested Burma would consider signing the Additional Protocol, which would allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) more authority to conduct inspections at suspicious sites.  These positive moves provide reassurance for U.S. and international concerns over the past several years that Burma had worked to illicitly procure sensitive, dual-use industrial equipment with applications in gas centrifuge manufacturing or missile development via North Korea and European countries.  Clinton noted during the visit that while concerns remain about missile cooperation with North Korea, “We’ve looked at this carefully and we do not see signs of a substantial effort at this time [on nuclear weapons development].” Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB) allegations and defector interviews claiming that Burma had or has a nuclear weapons research program remain unsubstantiated and poorly evidenced. Secretary Clinton’s visit follows intense pressure and scrutiny on the ascetic state over proliferation concerns, particularly over the past two years.  Earlier, in June 2011, Burma renounced all nuclear research aspirations. According to its vice president, Burma wished to avoid misunderstanding within the international community over the issue.  Despite the June pledge and the regime’s more recent statements during Secretary Clinton’s visit, the international community must remain steadfast in its calls on Burma to fully commit to nuclear non-proliferation objectives and allow full verification of those commitments.  To assuage international concerns over any nuclear activities, including cooperation with North Korea, Burma must advance its dialogue with the IAEA over the Additional Protocol, which President Sein claims to be ongoing, and both ratify and implement the agreement.  Burma should answer any questions the IAEA has about its nuclear activities and illicit procurement efforts relating to sensitive equipment potentially related to nuclear applications.  It should also allow the UN Panel of Experts on North Korea to visit the country and answer questions about past suspicious transfers and cooperation with North Korea.  Burma should provide an explanation for why it continues to send hundreds of students to Russia for training in nuclear and missile applications.  The international community should fully support Burma’s apparent push for openness and transparency over the nuclear issue and indicate that its confidence-building actions will garner incentives.  But in order to fully close the issue over Burma’s nuclear aspirations, the international community must implement a policy of “trust but verify.”  Read ISIS’s extensive set of assessments about evidence of nuclear aspirations in Burma here.          Myanmar 2011-12-12T14:39:43+00:00 http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/no-visible-evidence-of-explosion-at-esfahan-nuclear-site-adjacent-facility-/http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/no-visible-evidence-of-explosion-at-esfahan-nuclear-site-adjacent-facility-/#When:20:30:44Z An explosion reportedly occurred on Monday, November 28, 2011 somewhere in or near the city of Esfahan in Iran.  The Times reported that the blast occurred at the Esfahan nuclear site and that it has seen satellite imagery that showed “billowing smoke and destruction.”  The Times also cites “Israeli intelligence officials” as claiming that the blast was “no accident.”  ISIS has acquired DigitalGlobe satellite imagery of the Esfahan nuclear site taken on December 3, 2011 and December 5, 2011.  There does not appear to be any visible evidence of an explosion, such as building damage or debris, on the grounds of the known nuclear facilities or at the tunnel facility directly north of the Uranium Conversion Facility and Zirconium Production Plant at the Esfahan site (see figure 1).  It is still unclear where the reported blast occurred in Esfahan and whether it occurred anywhere near the nuclear facility.  ISIS has identified a facility near the Esfahan nuclear site that underwent a significant transformation recently.  The facility is approximately 400 meters away from the edge of a perimeter fence that surrounds the Esfahan nuclear site (see figure 2). An August 27, 2011 satellite image shows that the facility consisted of a ramp leading underground with several buildings along the surface (see figure 3).  In a December 5, 2011 satellite image, the buildings are gone, heavy equipment can be seen around the site and there is evidence of bulldozing activity (see figure 4).  These buildings were present on the site for at least 15 years (see figure 5).  It is unclear how and why the buildings are no longer present at the site.  Update: ISIS has learned that the buildings at this facility were being demolished prior to November 28, 2011.  ISIS has acquired a commercial satellite image taken on October 31, 2011, one month before the reported explosion, that shows the buildings at the site already razed (see figure 6).  It is also unclear whether this transformation is related to the November 28th, 2011 blast reported to have been heard throughout Esfahan.  ISIS has learned that this underground facility was originally a salt mine dating back to at least the 1980s, and that it has more recently been used for storage.  It is unclear what Iran stored in this underground facility.  The Times article quoted a “military intelligence source” saying the blast “caused damage to the facilities in Isfahan, particularly to the elements we believe were involved in storage of raw materials.” Figure 1.  December 3, 2011 DigitalGlobe satellite image of the Uranium Conversion Facility, Zirconium Production Plant and entrances to a tunnel facility at the Esfahan nuclear site.  There does not appear to be any visible evidence of an explosion at these facilities. Figure 2.  Wide-view of the entire Esfahan nuclear site.  The facility that underwent significant transformation recently is approximately 400 meters from a perimeter fence that surrounds the Esfahan nuclear site.  It is unclear if this facility is related to the Esfahan nuclear site. Figure 3.  August 27, 2011 satellite image showing the facility before a November 28, 2011 explosion reportedly heard throughout Esfahan. Figure 4.  December 5, 2011 satellite image showing the facility after a November 28, 2011 explosion was reportedly heard throughout Esfahan.  The buildings on the site are gone.  Large equipment and evidence of bulldozers on the site can be seen in the image.  It is unclear how and why the buildings are no longer present at the site.  Update: ISIS has learned that the buildings at this facility were being demolished prior to November 28, 2011. Figure 5.  Satellite image of the same facility from 1996.  All of the buildings seen in the August 27, 2011 image can be seen in this 1996 image as well. Figure 6.  Satellite image of the same facility from October 31, 2011, about one month before the blast reportedly occurred in or near the city of Esfahan.  The buildings have already been removed by this date. Iran 2011-12-08T20:30:44+00:00 http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/rendering-useless-south-africas-nuclear-test-shafts-in-the-kalahari-desert/http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/rendering-useless-south-africas-nuclear-test-shafts-in-the-kalahari-desert/#When:15:22:57Z South Africa 2011-11-30T15:22:57+00:00 http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/vyacheslav-danilenko-background-research-and-proliferation-concerns/http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/vyacheslav-danilenko-background-research-and-proliferation-concerns/#When:16:26:23Z In the debate about the November 11 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards report, some have falsely implied that Vyacheslav Danilenko did not know anything about nuclear weapons, or that he worked solely on nanodiamonds from the beginning of his research career, even though he worked at Chelyabinsk-70 for almost thirty years.1 The open source record demonstrates that these statements are incorrect and that Danilenko was involved in developing and using inwardly converging high pressure explosions and diagnostic systems to measure their effectiveness vital to the development of Soviet nuclear weapons.  As such, the open source record supports that when he assisted Iran in the 1990s, he was an ex-Soviet nuclear weapons expert. Given his background, Danilenko should have had reason to believe that his knowledge and expertise related to high explosive compression in nuclear weapons could be misused by the Iranians, even if he limited himself to advising on strictly non-nuclear weapon applications. In his statement to the IAEA Danilenko denied helping Iran build nuclear weapons but he admitted that he could not exclude that the information he provided was used for other purposes. Despite his denials, the IAEA suspects he helped Iran more than he has admitted so far. All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Technical Physics (VNIITF) In 1954 the Russian government decided to establish a backup nuclear design bureau in the Ural Mountains dedicated to the research and development of nuclear weapons. The facility was located over a thousand kilometers from Design Bureau 11 at Sarov in case this facility was ever lost in a conflict. A number of leading scientists headed up this new effort including E.N. Avrorin, E.I. Zababakhin, and K.K Krupnikov. Zababakhin headed the new institute which now bears his name.2  Feoksitistov states that over a third of the staff from Design Bureau 11 joined the new facility, named the All-Russian Scientific Research Institution of Technological Physics (VNIITF) at Chelyabinsk-70. It is believed that V.V. Danilenko’s career at Chelyabinsk-70 began in the late 1950s but the exact date when he came to the laboratory is uncertain. He became a member of the gas dynamics research group where gas dynamics refers to “the entire range of research pertaining to explosion physics, shock and detonation waves and non-standard gas dynamic flows.”3 Explosion physics deals primarily with the compressibility of a substance and has important applications to the design of nuclear explosives and weapons. By the early 1950s a number of different methods were available for the determination of the detonation parameters of explosive materials and in 1953 Yu Khariton asked a number of leading scientists to write an overview of the methods available in this important area.3 The range of experimentally investigated pressures exceeded by an order of magnitude the range which had been reached by U.S. researchers. The actual design of the shock compression devices used in these studies was not revealed until the 1990s.4 Thus, Danilenko was exposed to advanced methods of detonation directly applicable to nuclear weapons. In a 2004 article Danilenko wrote that Zababakhin first authorized the possibility of diamond synthesis via the shock compression of graphite in 1960 and that the detonation synthesis of nanodiamonds was discovered in July 1963.5 The early studies were done by M.N. Pavlovskii, K.K. Krupnikov, A.N. Dremin, and S.V. Pershin. Danilenko, K.V. Volkov and V.I. Elin were working at VNIITF. They obtained nanodiamonds from shock-compressed graphite in spherical and cylindrical ampoules.5 Danilenko has stated that he worked on the detonation synthesis from 1960-1963 but he has not revealed what else he worked on during his time at VNIITF.5 It is possible through a careful reading of Russian articles that have been published in recent years to understand the research being done by the gas dynamics group at VNIITF during the period of the 1960s and 1970s. In 1959, Zababakhin was involved in studying the convergence of a spherical shock wave in systems made up of alternating layers of low and high-density.6 He established the principle that “self-similar layer systems significantly enhance energy accumulation.” Gas Dynamics Group’s Work on Nanodiamonds Danilenko himself wrote that scientists from the gas dynamics group, including “K.V. Volkov, V.I. Elin, [and he], carried out the pioneering work in diamond synthesis from 1960-1965” owing to the initiative and support of Zababakhin.7 It is very likely that Danilenko was involved in these later shock compression studies that played an important role in the Russian nuclear program. The data obtained by the gas dynamics group on aluminum, lead, and other materials were critical in the formulation of more accurate models for predicting the equations of state of materials that are important to the design of nuclear weapons.8 A 1998 conference paper clarifies the role that carbon phase states play in the study of high explosives (HE) and said “carbon phase state in detonation products depends on their temperature and pressure and affects to detonation parameters of explosives because distinct carbon phases have different thermodynamic properties. Therefore, knowledge of carbon phase state in detonation products is important for accurate prediction of HE detonation characteristics.” 9 In the earliest Russian shock compression studies the “electrocontact method made possible comparative investigations of different [explosive] lens systems.”10 There were a number of different variants of these lenses which made it possible to create varying velocities and achieve different levels of compression.4 Gas dynamic studies played an important role in establishing how different materials behaved under conditions of compression and temperature and determining the dynamic compressibility of materials such as plutonium and uranium.  Danilenko was able to publish some of the results of these experiments in 1987. His first published paper was on the effects of nonideal detonation on impelled plate energy.11 In simple terms, this study looked at the relationship between detonation energy and initiation method. His second paper published in 1989 was on using the electrical contact method in shock studies.12 This study was a marked improvement over the sensors used in early shock waves studies. Electrocontact sensors measure the times of shock waves’ passage through gauge length reference points and allow for the determination of “time intervals between the times of actuation of several sensors positioned along the shock wave path in the specimen or along the path of the free surface.”12 In describing Danilenko’s design Y.V. Batkov and others stated that the electrocontact technique has been recently improved in order to enhance the accuracy and reliability of measured free-surface velocity.10 Danilenko published his earliest papers on nanodiamond synthesis around this same period of time.13 Conclusion Based on an open source review, Danilenko as a member of the gas dynamics group at VNIITF, would have been exposed to or involved in a number of nuclear weapons relevant areas of research and development. His experiments on the detonation synthesis of nanodiamonds would have been of direct importance to understanding the detonation properties of condensed explosives. His research would have also directly exposed him to the design of shock compression experiments and the techniques and methods of measuring experimental results. That knowledge would have been invaluable to researchers in the field. That Danilenko was hired by Dr. Seyed Abbas Shahmoradi, then leader of Iran’s Physics Research Center, responsible for its nuclear weaponization program demonstrates just how relevant Danilenko’s expertise was to Iran’s weaponization efforts. Open source reporting does not reveal how much of this information was shared with Iranian researchers during the period of his interaction with them. His expertise and research in the shock compression arena would have complimented research being carried out by various other Iranian organizations and helped spur advancements in nuclear weapon research and development that otherwise would have taken years of dedicated research to accomplish.     1 Gareth Porter, ‘Soviet nuclear scientist’ a rough diamond, Asia Times, November 11, 2011 2 S.M. Babadey, Gasdynamic Nuclear Fusion, Sarov Atom, August 29, 2002, Issue 21, 36-40 3 A.L. Mikhaylov, Gas Dynamics Research at VNIIEF, Sarov Atom, Augst 29, 2002, Issue 21, 6-12 4 L.V. Al’tshuler, R.F. Trunin, V.D. Urlin, V.E. Fortov and A.I. Funtikov (1999). Development of dynamic high-pressure techniques in Russia, Physics-Upsekhi, 42(3), 261-280 and R.F. Trunin (2004). Studies performed in Russia into the Compressibility of Metals in Strong Shock Waves, High Temperature, 42(1), 154-168 5 V.V. Danilenko (2004). On the History of the Discovery of Nanodiamond Synthesis, Physics of the Solid State, 46(4), 581-584 6 Y.I. Zababakhin (1965). Shock waves in laminar systems, Journal of Experimental and Technical Physics, 49(8), 642-645 7 V.V. Danilenko (2004). On the History of the Discovery of Nanodiamond Synthesis, Physics of the Solid State, 46(4), 581-584 8 E.N. Avrorin, V.A. Simenenko and L.I. Shibarshov (2006). Physics research during nuclear explosions, Physics-Uskekhi, 49(4), 432-4 9 S.B. Victorov and S.A. Gubin, Influence of Solid Carbon Phase Transitions on Detonation Parameters of High Explosives: Anomalous Mode of Detonation, International Conference on Shock Waves in Condensed Matter, St. Petersburg, Russia, July 12-17, 1998 10 Y.V. Batkov, V.A. Borisenok, S.I. Gerasimov, V.A. Komrachkov, A.D. Kovtum and M.V. Zhernokletov, Recording Fast Processes in Dynamic Studies, in Material Properties under Intensive Dynamic Loading, 3006, M.V. Zhernokletov and B.L. Glushak (Eds.) 11 V.V. Danilenko and Y.M. Pachurin (1987). Effects of Nonideal Detonation of Impelled Plate Energy, Combustion, Explosion and Shock Waves, 23(1), 46-49 12 N.I. Kurakin, V.V. Danilenko and N.P. Kozeruk (1989). Electrical Contact Procedure for Recording x, t-Diagrams, Combustion, Explosion and Shock Waves, 25(5), 89-92 13 K.V. Volkov, V.V. Danilenko and V.I. Elin (1990). Synthesis of Diamond from the Carbon in the Detonation Products of Explosives, Combustion, Explosion and Shock Waves, 26(3), 123-125 Iran 2011-11-29T16:26:23+00:00 http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/satellite-image-showing-damage-from-november-12-2011-blast-at-military-base/http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/satellite-image-showing-damage-from-november-12-2011-blast-at-military-base/#When:15:58:41Z ISIS has acquired commercial satellite imagery of a military compound near the town of Bid Kaneh1  in Iran where a large explosion occurred on November 12, 2011.  Compared to an earlier picture of the site, an image taken on November 22, 2011 shows that most of the buildings on the compound appear extensively damaged (see figures 1 and 2).  Some buildings appear to have been completely destroyed.  Some of the destruction seen in the image may have also resulted from subsequent controlled demolition of buildings and removal of debris.  There do not appear to be many pieces of heavy equipment such as cranes or dump trucks on the site, and a considerable amount of debris is still present.  About the same number of trucks are visible in the image after the blast as in an image from approximately two months prior to the blast.  Thus, most of the damage seen in the November 22, 2011 image likely resulted from the explosion. ISIS learned that the blast occurred as Iran had achieved a major milestone in the development of a new missile.  Iran was apparently performing a volatile procedure involving a missile engine at the site when the blast occurred.   Figure 1.  November 22, 2011 commercial satellite image showing extensive damage at a military base in Iran resulting from a November 12, 2011 explosion.  Most of the buildings on the compound are extensively damaged or destroyed.   Figure 2.  September 9, 2011 commercial satellite image of the same military base in Iran, for reference, approximately two months before the blast occurred.     1Allen Thomson, former intelligence analyst, located the geographic coordinates for the town of Bid Kaneh. Iran 2011-11-28T15:58:41+00:00 http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/irans-ridiculous-distraction/http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/irans-ridiculous-distraction/#When:22:47:28Z Iran should answer the IAEA’s concerns instead of trying to prevent the public from receiving in a timely manner widely available information about its nuclear activities In prepared statements to the Board of Governors in Vienna today, Iran’s ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Ali Asghar Soltanieh criticized ISIS for posting on its website the latest report on safeguards implementation in Iran and the assessment that ISIS performs of the data contained in the report.  In the remarks, Soltanieh states, “It comes as no surprise that almost at the same that the DG [Director General] report is released, the ISIS website publishes the report as well as sort of fictitious calculations as its evaluation on the detailed information of the report.” By posting the IAEA safeguards reports on its website, which ISIS has done for several years, ISIS is responding to the public’s need to view this information collectively and in a timely manner.  We could hold back the reports, which we receive from numerous government and non-governmental sources. However, the international community and the broader media have a need to receive important information on issues relating to nuclear proliferation, and, in particular, information on cases in which there is an egregious lack of cooperation with the IAEA—something that the Iranian government has demonstrated for years.  This is not the first time that the Iranian government has sought to keep the public in the dark and prevent ISIS from sharing with the public the safeguards reports.  Iran complained to the IAEA in a June 9, 2011 letter that ISIS disseminates the report on its website on the same day that it is released to all IAEA member states. Rather than trying to suppress vital information, Iran should fully explain to the international community its work related to nuclear weaponization as detailed in the recent IAEA report instead of complaining about ISIS’s efforts to serve the public good. By coming clean on its past and possibly current efforts to build nuclear weapons, Iran could resolve most concerns about its nuclear activities. Afterward, solving outstanding issues about its gas centrifuge program would be straightforward, as Brazil and South Africa learned many years ago. ISIS uses data in IAEA safeguards reports to track the number of installed centrifuges at Iran’s enrichment facilities and their operation. These data have recently shown the deficiencies of the IR-1 centrifuge at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant. Iran’s efforts to complain about this ISIS analysis showing the poor performance of the Fuel Enrichment Plant would be better spent reexamining the wisdom of a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment program, which nearly ten years after construction started at this facility and likely over a hundred million dollars of investment, will apparently never be capable of supporting a nuclear power program.  Iran’s civil enrichment program may manage only to fuel a research reactor in Tehran. By doing so, it may well achieve a world record of sorts, namely producing the most expensive research reactor fuel ever. Answering the concerns of the IAEA and the international community and receiving a foreign supply of low enriched uranium for its civil reactors and thereby avoiding continued sanctions also makes far more economical sense, unless of course Iran really intends to build nuclear weapons. Iran, ISIS In Brief 2011-11-18T22:47:28+00:00 http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/irans-work-and-foreign-assistance-on-a-multipoint-initiation-system-for-a-n/http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/irans-work-and-foreign-assistance-on-a-multipoint-initiation-system-for-a-n/#When:02:23:21Z The November 8, 2011 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards report on Iran identifies a foreign expert that may have been important to Iran’s development of implosion detonation systems used in nuclear weapons. The Agency writes in the report that it has “strong indications that the development by Iran of the high explosives initiation system, and its development of the high speed diagnostic configuration used to monitor related experiments, were assisted by the work of a foreign expert who was not only knowledgeable in these technologies, but who, a Member State has informed the Agency, worked for much of his career with this technology in the nuclear weapon programme of the country of his origin.” Information in other IAEA documents reviewed by ISIS identifies this person as Vycheslav V. Danilenko1.  Born in 1934, Danilenko worked in the nuclear weapon complex at VNIITF, Chelyabinsk-70 for three decades.  At VNIITF in the early 1960s, he was a member of the gas dynamics group and became involved in the study of the manufacture of synthetic diamonds. He worked with leading explosives experts in the Soviet nuclear weapons program and developed understanding of the fundamentals of detonation, including shock compression. In 1960, the head of VNIIF, B. I. Zababakhin, launched the institute’s research into the possibility of diamond synthesis by using the shock compression of graphite. Leading Soviet nuclear weapons experts were leaders in this effort in the early 1960s. In a recent book chapter Danilenko says that “experiments aimed at developing methods for synthesis were highly classified; for security reason, the results were initially contained only in secret reports from VNIITF.”2  According to IAEA officials, he likely had knowledge of the application of high explosives in the Soviet nuclear weapons program.  Given his background and experience, this ex-Soviet nuclear weapons expert was well versed in key aspects of developing nuclear weapons. Danilenko also has experience in the important area of the diagnostics of high explosions. His publications include work on high-speed photography and describe optical techniques by which fiber optic cables are used to capture the time of arrival of explosive shock waves. After leaving VNIITF in either 1989 or 1991, Danilenko moved to Ukraine and established the company ALIT in Kiev, producing ultra-dispersed diamonds (UDD or nanodiamonds). He experienced economic difficulties by the mid-1990s. According to the IAEA, he contacted the Iranian embassy in mid-1995, offering his expertise on UDD. At the end of the year, he was contacted by Dr. Seyed Abbas Shahmoradi, who headed the Physics Research Center and also worked at the Sharif University of Technology.3    Danilenko signed a contract with Shahmoradi, according to IAEA documents.  As head of Iran’s secret nuclear sector involved in the development of nuclear weapons, Shahmoradi would have undoubtedly recognized Danilenko’s value to an incipient nuclear weapons effort. Synthetic diamond production is unlikely to have been a priority, although it has obvious value as a cover story. In assessing the important contributions make by scientists and engineers to secret proliferant state nuclear programs, ISIS has not found any that did not initially offer other, more benign assistance that provided a plausible cover for their secret nuclear assistance.  In some cases, their intention was originally benign but they were lured by money to assist in sensitive nuclear areas. According to the recent IAEA safeguards report, Danilenko worked in Iran from about 1996 until about 2002, “ostensibly to assist Iran in the development of a facility and techniques for making UDD, where he also lectured on explosion physics and its applications.”  He told the IAEA that he lectured and constructed an explosive firing cylinder which was not designed for experiments on spherical systems.  In 2002, he returned to Russia. The IAEA has reviewed publications by Danilenko and has met with him. It has been able to verify through three separate sources, including the expert himself, that he was in Iran during that time.  Danilenko told the IAEA that he does not exclude that his information was used for other purposes.  At the very least, Danilenko had reason to know or should have known exactly why the Iranians were interested in his research and expertise.  The IAEA information suggests he provided more than he has admitted. Nature of Assistance The IAEA obtained additional information that adds credibility to the conclusion that Danilenko used his technical and practical knowledge and expertise to provide assistance to Iran’s program to develop a suitable initiation system for a nuclear explosive device. The IAEA assessed that a monitoring, or diagnostic, technique described in one of his papers had a remarkable similarity to one that the IAEA saw in material from a member state about a hemispherical initiation and explosives system developed in Iran (see below).  This system is also described in the IAEA safeguards report as a multipoint initiation system used to start the detonation of a nuclear explosive. The system that the IAEA says Iran was developing prior to 2004 was relatively sophisticated and small in diameter. Iran is unlikely to have been able to design it on its own.  According to the November 2011 IAEA safeguards report, Iran is also believed to have obtained information from the A.Q. Khan network on nuclear weapons design. But the initiation and explosive system is sufficiently sophisticated that it points to a contribution from Danilenko. The multipoint initiation system has a distributed array of explosive filled channels on an aluminum hemisphere which terminate at holes containing explosive pellets. The pellets simultaneously explode to initiate the entire outer surface of a high explosive component in hemispherical form. The experiments used a multitude of fiber optic cables and a high speed streak camera to measure the time of arrival of first light across the inner surface of an explosive component, thereby deducing the smoothness of the detonation front at this surface. The IAEA also obtained from member states details of the design, development, and possible testing of what is called in IAEA information the R265 shock generator system, which is a round multipoint initiation system that would fit inside the payload chamber of the Shahab 3 missile tri-conic nose cone. This device involves a hemispherical aluminum shell with an inside radius of 265 mm and wall thickness of 10 mm thick. Outer channels are cut into the outer surface of the shell, each channel one by one millimeter, and contain explosive material. Each channel terminates in a cylindrical hole, 5 mm in diameter, that is drilled though the shell and contains an explosive pellet.4  The geometrical pattern formed by channels and holes is arranged in quadrants on the outer hemispheric surface which allows a single central point of initiation and the simultaneous detonation of explosives in all the holes on the hemisphere. This in turn allows the simultaneous initiation of all the high explosives under the shell by one exploding bridgewire (EBW). If properly prepared, the R265 constitutes the outer part of an explosively driven implosion system for a nuclear device. The outer radius of the R265 system is 275 millimeters, or a diameter of 550 millimeters, less than the estimated diameter of about 600 millimeters available inside the payload chamber of a Shahab 3 (or the Sejjil-2 missile). 5 In one of the slides of Project 111’s presentational material in the possession of the IAEA, a photo shows an aluminum support plate with R288 written on it that is for a payload undergoing machining.6  The implication is that the R265 system could be attached to this support plate that is fixed to the payload chamber. According to information provided to the IAEA, the testing of the R265 system involved evaluating the uniformity of the time of arrival of the detonation front, which is measured at the inner surface of 50 kilograms of composition B hemispherical explosive charge located inside the aluminum hemisphere. Hundreds of fiber optic cables are placed in another thin hemispherical shell placed in proximity of the inner surface of the high explosive. The other end of the fiber cables go to a fixture for a rotating mirror that is part of a high speed streak camera.  When the EBW detonator is fired in the center of the hemispherical shock generator, the complex explosive distribution system initiates the high explosive charge. The detonation front travels through the composition B explosives and on exiting produces light, which is captured on film in the streak camera via the fiber optics cables, allowing a determination of smoothness of the converging shockwave. With this system, Iran would need only two EBWs to initiate a nuclear explosion.  This system may have been tested in 2003, which is discussed further below. In any case, the IAEA assessed that this information suggests Iran developed an effective high explosive implosion system which can fit within the payload container of the reentry vehicle of the Shabab 3.  However, IAEA officials also assessed that this system was not finished when the program abruptly halted in 2003 (see below). Recent IAEA Safeguards Report The November 2011 IAEA report does not discuss the R265 system explicitly.  However, it appears to discuss it in general terms.  According to the recent IAEA safeguards report, the IAEA has shared with Iran information that indicates that Iran has had access to information on the design concept of a multipoint initiation system that can be “used to initiate effectively and simultaneously a high explosive charge over its surface.”  The IAEA has been able to confirm independently the existence of a multi-point initiation design concept and the country of origin of that design concept.  Furthermore, nuclear-weapon states have informed the IAEA that the specific multipoint initiation concept is used in some known nuclear explosive devices. The IAEA also received information from a member state that Iran tested this multipoint initiation concept in “at least one large-scale experiment in 2003 to initiate a high explosive charge in the form of a hemispherical shell.”  Further, “the internal hemispherical curved surface of the high explosive charge was monitored using a large number of optical fibre cables, and the light output of the explosive upon detonation was recorded with a high speed streak camera. It should be noted that the dimensions of the initiation system and the explosives used with it were consistent with the dimensions for the new payload which, according to the alleged studies documentation, were given to the engineers who were studying how to integrate the new payload into the chamber of the Shahab 3 missile re-entry vehicle (Project 111).”  Further information provided to the IAEA by the same member state indicates that the large-scale high explosive experiments were conducted by Iran in the region of Marivan. The IAEA has provided Iran with this information. However, in a 117-page submission to the IAEA in May 2008, Iran stated that it did not understand the subject and had not conducted any activities of the type referred to in the document. Parchin The IAEA also reported in its recent report that information from member states indicates that Iran constructed a large explosives containment vessel or chamber at the Parchin military complex in 2000 to conduct high explosive and hydrodynamic experiments.  The latter are experiments conducted in which fissile and nuclear components may be replaced with surrogate materials.  After constructing the chamber, Iran constructed a building around the large cylindrical object. According to the report, “a large earth berm was subsequently constructed between the building containing the cylinder and a neighboring building, indicating the probable use of high explosives in the chamber.” The IAEA has obtained commercial satellite images that are consistent with this information. From independent evidence, including a publication by Danilenko, according to the report, “the IAEA has been able to confirm the date of construction of the cylinder and some of its design features (such as its dimensions), and that it was designed to contain the detonation of up to 70 kilograms of high explosives.” This cylinder would be suitable for carrying out experiments containing the amount of explosive in the R265 system described above. The IAEA report did not provide Danilenko’s involvement, if any, in this chamber.  On November 11, 2011, the Associated Press reported that his involvement may have extended to this chamber. Diplomats in Vienna at the IAEA told the Associated Press that Danilenko’s son-in-law had told the IAEA Danilenko also helped Iran build a large steel chamber to contain the force of the blast set off by high explosives testing.7  The son-in-law reportedly said that the container was built under Danilenko’s direct supervision. The IAEA became suspicious about Parchin in 2004 and investigated whether Iran was conducting high explosive testing there, possibly with nuclear materials. After at first resisting, Iran allowed the IAEA to make two partial, highly controlled inspections of a portion of the Parchin complex.  The IAEA, along with ISIS, had used commercial satellite imagery to identify a number of areas of interest.  None of the buildings visited by the IAEA, however, included the location now believed to contain the building which houses the explosives chamber.  Consequently, the IAEA’s visits did not reveal facilities or activities of relevance. A Potential Test Site The IAEA received a schematic diagram for an underground testing site that is 400 meters deep with a control unit 10 kilometers away. The diagram shows the placement of a high voltage power generator. The information shows the development of a remote system for firing an object in the 400 meter-deep shaft.  Text accompanying the diagram calls for the simultaneous remote firing of two spark gap detonators. Although EBWs are safer, both methods would work. Is this related to the two EBWs needed to set off the two halves of the R265 system? According to the November 2011 safeguards report, the IAEA has been informed by another member state that these arrangements directly reflect those which have been used in nuclear tests conducted by nuclear-weapon states.  IAEA officials assessed that this information is most likely related to testing a nuclear explosive device, although it reflects the conceptual development of a test rather than representing an engineering drawing or plan. Post-2004 Work Information available to the IAEA makes clear that Iran’s nuclear weaponization effort stopped abruptly, without finishing work on developing a reliable warhead for the Shahab 3.  Although the report does not discuss the reason for such a halt, Iran was under intense pressure at that time to halt all its secret nuclear activities. The IAEA in 2003 was exposing a wide range of secret Iranian nuclear sites and activities and showing Iran’s flagrant violation of its verification requirements under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, actions highly embarrassing internationally to the Iranian regime. The United States had also just invaded Iraq, and Iran must have worried it could be next.  As a result of all this pressure, Iran agreed to suspend its uranium enrichment program in late 2003 and allow more intrusive IAEA inspections. It apparently also decided to shut down and hide its nuclear weaponization effort, something which the program’s leader Mohsen Fakhrizadeh is known to have opposed.  U.S. intelligence learned of his opposition to a halt, according to a European source, and his outspokenness is one of the more compelling reasons to believe the conclusion that Fakhrizadeh’s program was halted. However, the IAEA report outlines how Fakhrizadeh was able later to reestablish some activities under his leadership.  According to the report, he retained leadership, “first under a new organization known as the Section for Advanced Development Applications and Technologies (SADAT)8,  which continued to report to MODAFL [Ministry of Defense Armed Forces Logistics], and later, in mid-2008, as the head of the Malek Ashtar University of Technology (MUT) in Tehran.  The Agency was advised by a Member State that, in February 2011, Mr. Fakhrizadeh moved his seat of operations from MUT to an adjacent location known as the Modjeh Site, and that he now leads the Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research. The Agency is concerned because some of the activities undertaken after 2003 “would be highly relevant to a nuclear weapon programme.” One of those activities could involve the multipoint initiation system and Iran’s nanodiamond project could be a front for such work.  According to the report, the IAEA “has received information from two Member States that, after 2003, Iran engaged in experimental research involving a scaled down version of the hemispherical initiation system and high explosive charge referred to [above], albeit in connection with non-nuclear applications. This work, together with other studies made known to the Agency in which the same initiation system is used in cylindrical geometry, could also be relevant to improving and optimizing the multipoint initiation design concept relevant to nuclear applications.” Iranian nanodiamond research is centered at Malek Ashtar University of Technology, and not Sharif University of Technology, which does most of the materials science related research.  One of these researchers is Saeed (Saeid) Borji, who was named by the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) as being associated with Iran’s nuclear program. If one leaves aside the NCRI allegation, it is still relevant that so much nanodiamond work is conducted at Malek Ashtar University. Final Note On November 10, 2011, Reuters reported on an interview with Danilenko by the Russian newspaper, Kommersant.  He reportedly stated to Kommersant, “I am not a nuclear physicist and am not the founder of the Iranian nuclear program.”  He reportedly refused to provide any additional information. It is not clear what questions Kommersant asked Danilenko, but the November IAEA safeguards report does not allege that Danilenko is a “founder” of Iran’s nuclear program, as the program pre-dates the start of his assistance to Iran in the mid-1990s.  Similarly, the IAEA never alleges that Danilenko is a nuclear physicist, but rather that he may have assisted Iran in the development of a spherical high explosives multipoint initiation system.  It remains for Danilenko to more fully explain his assistance to Iran.   1Paul-Anton Krueger was the first to identify Danilenko, although not by name, in an article in Sueddeutsche Zeitung, February 5, 2010. The article discussed among other topics the Iranian multipoint initiation system to which Danilenko is alleged to have contributed. 2Olga A. Shenderova and Dieter M. Gruen (editors), Ultracrystalline Diamond: Synthesis, Properties and Applications (Norwich, NY: William Andrew Publishing, 2006). 3Seyed Abbas Shahmoradi is currently associated with Malek Ashtar University. 4PETN-based explosives. 5IISS Strategic Dossier: Iran’s Ballistic Missile Capabilities: A Net Assessment (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, May 10, 2010). 6Project 111 was involved in 2003 with the design of the inner cone of the Shahab 3 missile re-entry vehicle and the production of an explosives operations control set (ECS) for a new payload. It is an engineering operation to accommodate a warhead into the Shabab 3 re-entry vehicle and understand flight dynamics and arming and fusing. 7George Jahn, “IAEA shows Iran nuke program intel to 35 nations,” Associated Press. November 11, 2011. 8On the ISIS web site, the acronym used is FEDAT.  Iran 2011-11-14T02:23:21+00:00 http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/isis-analysis-of-iaea-iran-safeguards-report-part-1/http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/isis-analysis-of-iaea-iran-safeguards-report-part-1/#When:21:51:53Z Iran 2011-11-08T21:51:53+00:00 http://isis-online.org/iaea-reports/detail/implementation-of-the-npt-safeguards-agreement-in-the-islamic-republic-of-i/http://isis-online.org/iaea-reports/detail/implementation-of-the-npt-safeguards-agreement-in-the-islamic-republic-of-i/#When:17:22:34Z Iran 2011-11-08T17:22:34+00:00 http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/iran-nuclear-issue-considerations-for-a-negotiated-outcome/http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/iran-nuclear-issue-considerations-for-a-negotiated-outcome/#When:15:39:48Z   Read John Carlson’s paper at ISISNuclearIran here: Iran Nuclear Issue – Considerations for a Negotiated Outcome       Iran 2011-11-04T15:39:48+00:00 http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/debunking-gregory-jones-again2/http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/debunking-gregory-jones-again2/#When:13:55:16Z On October 18, Gregory Jones published a response to ISIS’s September 20 critique of his study on breakout timelines at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) in Iran. Jones maintains that Iran could fabricate 20 kg of weapon-grade uranium (WGU)—enough for one nuclear weapon—in two months in a breakout scenario at Natanz, while ISIS estimates that such a scenario would take at least six months.  Unfortunately, his conclusions are founded on an unreliable method. As a result, his estimate dramatically understates the amount of time Iran would need to produce 20 kg of WGU at the FEP. In emails with one of us, Jones made clear that his calculations rely entirely on a separative work calculator, such as the one found at www.wise-uranium.org, to determine the enriched uranium output of a centrifuge plant. A separative work calculator is a useful, but very basic, means of estimating enriched uranium output and the correlating timeframes. Despite its inordinate length, his new response included neither a detailed calculation to justify his controversial result nor a compelling explanation for his use of a separative work calculator to estimate WGU production at the FEP. He fails to address ISIS’s critique that this method results in unreliable estimates when it is applied to this plant. Jones attempts in this response to justify his application of a separative work calculation at the FEP almost entirely by citing an article published in 2008 by Alexander Glaser. In his response, Jones goes further and claims that his calculations are “an adaptation of calculations by Glaser.” In reality, Jones merely used a separative work calculator and later attempted to justify his choice by citing Glaser. He has not performed any detailed calculations as Glaser and ISIS have done. But Jones’s analysis has a bigger problem. Jones’s justification depends on calculations made by Glaser that are not applicable to the estimation of the production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) at the FEP. Moreover, Glaser is aware of this problem. In our initial critique, we did not address Jones’s cavalier dismissal of information and data that contradicts his conclusions but that he did not access. In his August 9, 2011 paper, he does not appear to be aware of ISIS’s newer calculations about breakout times at the FEP.  Nonetheless, he must have been aware of U.S. government estimates, widely cited in the media about a year ago, that breakout at Natanz would require about a year. Here is what he writes about such estimates: “Other estimates of when Iran might be able to produce the HEU required for nuclear weapons are often given as flat statements with no supporting analysis.  This is especially so for the estimates given by various U.S. government officials.  In many cases these estimates appear to be merely wishful thinking.  As I have written elsewhere, the distinguished intelligence analyst Roberta Wohlstetter noted a phenomenon where analysts when faced with an unpleasant reality instead engage in self-deception by constructing a more pleasant fiction that allows the analysts to avoid facing up to the more unpleasant reality.” Jones does not appear to have attempted to understand the reasoning behind the U.S. estimate, merely dismissing it as politicized intelligence.  However, had he learned the basis of the U.S. estimate—and U.S. officials relatively freely talked to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) about this estimate made by the Department of Energy—he would have learned why his estimate is therefore viewed as so extreme. He also could have learned that, at that time, Israel assessed that breakout at the FEP would take less than a year but more than six months. ISIS Estimates Over a year ago, ISIS estimated that breakout at the FEP would take approximately six months, before the additional problems that Iran experienced over the past year at the FEP materialized. Naturally, the continued high rates of breakage, the decreasing enrichment levels attained at the FEP, and the decreasing average low-enriched uranium (LEU) output per IR-1 centrifuge over the past year only further complicate Iran’s ability to make WGU at the FEP. Therefore, ISIS does not believe that Iran is currently capable of shortening this breakout time at the FEP.  It is true, as Jones points out, that ISIS used separative work calculations in the March 3, 2010 ISIS study Supplement to Iran’s Gas Centrifuge Program: Taking Stock.  However, for this study, ISIS used this method as a way to perform a worst-case assessment, namely an estimate of the least amount of time possible for Iran to breakout at the FEP.  ISIS did not estimate the likely time in which a breakout would occur. Jones and the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC) have misinterpreted our method and mistakenly implied that our estimate roughly matches theirs.  1 When ISIS uses separative work calculators, they comprise only one part of a larger analysis that involves cascade design, plant performance, breakage rates, and other elements specific to the Natanz FEP and the IR-1 centrifuge design. Over a year and a half ago, ISIS decided to further modify its approach, taking into account a number of real-life problems experienced in FEP centrifuge cascade operation.  Since then, ISIS has applied more sophisticated calculations by a well-known centrifuge expert who uses a fixed plant production model in the case of FEP breakout.  Our critique of Jones’s approach is derived from these improved, more realistic assessments and our extensive experience estimating breakout times at the FEP.     1. Jones claims that there are mistakes in the March 3, 2010 ISIS study Supplement to Iran’s Gas Centrifuge Program: Taking Stock.  However, what he points out in the study are not errors. Jones evidently does not realize that our estimates have different units, namely we use uranium hexafluoride mass, not just uranium mass, which is the unit he uses. He assumed we must have used the same unit as he did.  Compounding his error, he misinterprets “several months” in the March 2010 study as “1.5 to 3.5 months,” where he uses the wrong conversion factor to go from total weapon-grade uranium to the number of weapons and time to produce a weapon.  He uses a conversion factor that is for uranium mass only. Admittedly, the units have been confusing in this debate, with uranium hexafluoride mass often confused with uranium mass. At ISIS, we have sometimes been guilty of not specifying which units we are using, and the March 3, 2010 paper is one of those cases. As a result, we have since instituted a policy to clearly state the units. However, the inability of Jones to recognize the alternative unit, which is typically listed along with the result in uranium mass in popular separative work calculators, is just another reason why we recommend that groups such as the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, seek additional review of Jones’s work before they publish it. Iran, ISIS In Brief 2011-10-27T13:55:16+00:00 http://isis-online.org/conferences/detail/highlights-from-david-albrights-talk-on-irans-nuclear-program-at-george-was/http://isis-online.org/conferences/detail/highlights-from-david-albrights-talk-on-irans-nuclear-program-at-george-was/#When:18:18:14Z David Albright on Iran’s Nuclear Program from GW's Elliott School on Vimeo. Iran 2011-10-21T18:18:14+00:00